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CHAPTER I.
V 0 C A T I 0 N.
The Bar - English and American compared.- The
Individual - AttorneysSolicitors,Counsel etc.-
Test Oath Cases - Officer of the Court.
English and American social institutions are,alone,
characterized by a peculiar inherent similarity; moving
about in their own kindred spheresalike in general or-
ganism,yet widely differing in detail,moulded and swayed
by a different people but of the same raceby a different
land and physical conditions Out of a relative climate,
by different socialpoliticalmoral and economical in-
fluencesithus retaining a characteristic likeness which
even time cannot efface. From their organization,
throughout their various operations to the end,we trace
both a marked similarity and a dissimilarity. So with
the English and American Bar. In the Colonies the
Bar reappeared upon new soil under a variety of circum-
stances and diversity of influences,consequently chang-
ing accordingly,still retaining the general salient
features of the mother institution. Separating the two
there is no clearly defined line of demarcation save the
broad expanse of the Atlantic; the line cannot be drawn
but it may be traced. Thus we note in their general
features a likeness-they varying only in conformity to
the change in social and physical influences and condit-
tions of the two countries.
There is no distinction in this country between
"barristersu and "attorneysu;every lawyer is permitted
to take every kind of business: argue cases in the high-
est courts of his state and of the United States,pre-
pare the case for trial and conduct it in person through-
out all its proceedings in courtconfer with the client
and witnesses ,gather evidence, issue the writprepare
the comnlaint,in briefconduct the cause through all its
intricate proceedings from the issuing of the original
writ to the issuing o of execution on the final judgment.
He may make whatever contract he pleases directly with
his clientjmaintain an action to recover his fees,aniy
pari rationemay be sued for negligence in the perfor-
mance of his professional dutywhile in England the
"barrister" bargains with the client and the uattorney"
with the barrister.
Turningnowfrom the Bar to the individual we see
a man pre-eminently fitted as a leader; we see him at
the head of great refons and combined movement of what-
ever nature. Scarcely do we find combined money,
learning or skill without its being put in motion through
the guidance of one learned in the law; his influence
extends from municipality to state and from state to
nation - he is chief among the secondary forces of pub-
lic life.
He is thus valued as a leader because he is skilled
and talented in his professionjandlike all other pro-
fessions,it is one to be attained through moral merit
and hours of arduous study. He professes to be skilled
in the law and with the ponderous responsibilities he
assumeshe must bejfor let him remeember that every eye
is fixed upnn his weaknesses and every ear is open to the
detection of his errors.
His character is that of the assimilation of op-
posite qualitiesa quick discernment with a profound
understandingan imagination with discreet judgnent,a
knowledge of books with a knowledge of mankind,cunning
and schrewdness with sterling integrity,all those subtle
qualities which make up the stature of the perfect man.
In the words of Hoffman,"the word law is of a comprehen-
sive signification, lawyer is still more soembracing the
richness and solidity of learning,the profundity of wis-
dom,the purity of morals)the soundness of integrity,
the ornaments of literaturethe amiableness of urbanity,
the graces of modestyargenerally,the decorations and
amenities of life,and Raithby adds that"he who is a great
lawyer must be a great and good man.
As an officer of the court of justice his object
ought notsolely,to be the attainment of victory in his
hotly contested forensic battles but rather to avail the
client of full and complete justice ,to do for the client
what the ordinary layman cannot do for himself. And in
order to do this he ought to be singularly familiar with
the law governing his conduct as officer of the court,
in relation to his client,and to the public. And it is
5not presumptuous to assert that an attorney's first duty
before entering his professionis to study well those
legal principles which govern his rights,duties and
liabilities. And with this thought in view it will be
the endeavor of this thesis to trace those primary prin-
ciples through his relation to his client and to the
court,
To more thoroughly enable the reader to appreciate
the distinction and its origin above stated the various
designations applied to lawyers and their distinction
will here be no'ed. They are:
1. uAdvocates. " An advocate is defined to be "an
officer of the court learned in the law,who is engaged by
a suitor to maintain or defend his cause" having the
exclusive privilegein civil and ecclesiastical cases,
of addressing the court,either by written or oral argu-
ment.
2. "Barristers.' A barrister is one whose duty is
limited to pleading at the bar. He cannot be an attorney
nor can an attorney be a barrister at one and the sw.ie
time.
3. "Attorneys. "  "An attorney" says Sir.Edward
Coke, usignifieth one that is set in the turn, stead or
place of another",thus giving it scope enough to in-
clude both attorneys in fact and attorneys at law,
and Blackstone qualifies it by adding,"to manage his
(suitors) matters of law. u Attorneys in England could
not address the court but merely prepared the case for
trial,drafted legal documentsinstitutud suits,and
brought them to an issue by proper pleadings. In this
country an attorney at law is given a much more liberal
meaning and may be defined to be an officer of a court
of reconi,learned in the law,legally qualified,by ad-
mission to the bar, to prosecute and defend legal causes
by authority of the retainer ; of his client. This
definition will be seen to be broad enough to include
those practicing in both courts of law and equity under
our systea while it also excludes mere ministerial acts.
4. "Counsellors. " A counsel is one associated
in the management of a cause acting as legal adviser in
all matters requiring legal skill and judgment.
5. 'Proctors." A proctor is one whose practice
is confined to admiralty and ecclesiastical courts.
6. aSolicitors." A solicitor is one who takes
charge of,prosecutes or superintends affairs of a legal
natureunconnected with the courts of conmon law. By
modern use distinguishing one who practices in equity
from an attorney practicing in corpsmon law proceedings.
While these various distinctions are maintained
in Englandas a general rule in the United States the
single term"attorney" includes all persons superintend-
ing legal causes of whatever nature and will be given
this meaning as used in these pages. But to this
general rule there are exceptions:
In the Federal courts a mere formal distinction
is retained,the term "attorney" denoting those practicirg
on the law side of the court and the terms "counsel" and
"solicitor" denoting those practicing on the equity side,
given the meanings as above stated. As to solicitor
and counsel in equity the distinction exists merely for
the purpose of signing legal papers e.g.the pleadings.
(Story's Equity sec.47 n.): New Jersey,Ja state
curiously conservative in some points",still adheres
strictly to the distinction between attorney and counsel,
the attorney having to practice aS such for three years
after admission to the barand undergo a rigid examina-
t.ionbefore he can practice as a counselon the theory
that it requires a more profound knowledge of the law to
perform the duties of counsel.
To lay the basis for a thorough understanding of
the legal principles which govern the attorney's rela-
tions to his client,to the court and to the pu lic,it
will be necessary to determine the nature and stability
of his office as minister of justice. And this leads
us to a discussion of the
Test Oath Cases.
"The profession of an attorney and counsellor is
not like an office created by an act of Congress,which
depenis for its continuance,its powers,aid its emolumnents
upon the will of the creator,and the possession of which
may be burdened by any conditions not prohibited by the
constitution. Attorneys and counsellors are not of-
ficers of the United States; they are officers of the
court admitted as such by its order upon evidence of
their possessing sufficient legal learningand a fair
private character. They hold their office during good
behaviorjand can only be deprived of it for miscoYluct,
ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court,
after opportunity to be heard has been offered."
Bet-er words cannot be found than those of Mr.Justice
Field in the great case of ex parte Garland (4 Wall.333),
to describe the nature of the officejand its relation to
the courts and to the constitution. They are the
very nuclei upon which the rights,dutiesand liabilities
of attorneys are foundedand it is curious to note that
this important principle had not sooner been judicially
stated. This case finally settled the long mooted
inquiry)whether the vocation was characterized as an
officejif so,what was its nature. Was it a government
or state office; was it civil~politicalor private; was
it an office of 'public trust" under the constitution ?
It also settled the stability and quality of the voca-
tion and the property right therein. This case may be
properly called the Polar Star in the law of attorneys.
Mr. Justice Field continues: "The attorney and counsellor
being,by the solemn judicial act of the courtclothed
with his office,does not hold it as a matter of grace
and favor. The right which it confers upon him, to
appear for suitors,aind to argue casesis something more
than a mere indulgencerevocable at the pleasure of the
courtor at the conzand of the legislature. It is a
right of which he can only be deprived by the judgment
of the court,for moral or professional delinquency. '
The facts of this case werebriefly ,as follows: an
act of Congress required all officers of honor or profit
under the United States to take and subscribe a Otest
oath" to the effect that they had never borne arLs
against the United Stal.esnor given voluntary aid to
persons in armed hostility thereto,and that they had
never sought,accepted,or exercised any office whatever,
under any authority hostile to the United States.
Garland followed the state of Arkansas in the aet of
secession from the Union,was a representative in the
Senate of the Confederate Congressand by reason of
such office could not take and subscribe the required
oath. But he contended that such an expurgatory oath
was unconstitutional and void,in which contention the
Supreme Court of he United Statcs concurred.
According with the above viewand at about the
same timeare cases to be found in Alabama2 Virginia,
New YorkSouth Carolina and Calafornia.
The inquiry aroseindirectlyjin our own state "In
the matter of Oathes to be taken by Attorneys a :d
Counsellors' (20 John.Ch.492) Platt J.said: uThe
point is simply whether an attorney or counsellor holds
an office of public trust in the sense of the constitu-
tion. x x x x x x In my jud2pent,an attorney or coun-
sellor does not hold an officejbut exercises a privilege
or franchise. As attorneys or counsellors they perform
no duties on behalf of the government - they exercise
no public trust."
Therefore we may conclude that an attorney at law
is neither a state nor federal3 civiljpolitical or public
officer;neither is he an officer of public trust under
the constitution. He is simply an officer of the court
(of record) holding such office as a vested right,
rather than through grace~favoror mere indulgence. This
conclusion has been reiterated in the case of In re
Thomas (27 Pac. (Colo.)77) in which Helm C.J. after a
careful investigation said : "Our conclusion is that
attorneys are notper se,civil officers within the
meaning of the constitutional phrase."
Although it is not our intention to discuss the
admission of attorneysthere is one point,the admission
of womenpassed upon in the above case which deserves
our attention because of the rapid change in conformity
to modern sentiment and because it is likely to become
an important question. In the absence of constitutional
or statutory inhibition women will be admitted to the
bar on equal terms with men. (In re Thomas,supra.) In
the language of Helm C.J.,"The question is therefore
squarely presented., are women entitled to admission
to the bar of this state on equal terns with men ? We
have no disposition to postpone alling into line with
the Supreme Court of the United States and other enlignht
ened tribunals through the country that have finally,
voluntarily or in ob)edience to statutory injunction,
discarded the criterion of sexand opened the door of
the profession to women as well as men". This con-
stitutes quite a departure from the old doctrine based
on "the wide difference in the respective spheres and
destinies of men and women" and denying to women the
right to enter the profession. (Bradwell vs.The State
16 Wall.130). But now women have a right to practice
law on the same basis as men do,and in nearly all the
states it has become recognized, either by statute or by
the courtsthat they may practice of a right when pos-
sessing tne requisite legal learning. Is it just and
fair that women having the right to follow all other
honorable trades,professions,and vocationsshould be
barred from practicing the legal profession ? Is this
sole vocation more remote from her "sphere" or "des-
tinies than innumetable other vocations open to her ?
In re Thomasjustly decidedanswers in the negativeand
may be said to represent the trend of modern judicial
opinion.
Having determined that the attorney is character-
ized as an officer of the courtand noting his relatiorf
thereto,the next chapter may naturally be devoted to an
examination of the court's sur-r.ary jurisdiction over
him as its officerfor moral and professional delinquency,
CHAPTER II.
Summary jurisdiction - Striking from rolls -
Suspension - Contempt.
Summary jurisdiction is the power of the court to
concisely and suir-arily deal with all matters coming
before it,in the proceedure of a cause,which,from their
nature,and in the light of all the surrounding circum-
stancesrequire the prompt and speedy action of the
court in order to relieve from,or interceptsome injury
which,had the court proceeded in its ordinary plenary
methodwould probably have worked irreparable damage to
the injured person whether a party in interest, the
court,or a third person. Many are these cases,al-
though in many instances simple and unimportant in them-
selves,which,if not determined with rapidity and pre-
cision,would vitally affect the cause of action and its
remedy. So this jurisdiction as applied to and exerted
over attorneys includes all cases of misconduct on be-
half of the attorney which,if otherwise uncheckedmight
irreparabty prejudice some right or interest in the
cause; for examplewhere the attorney is acting without
authority. In this case the party may have the pro-
ceedings set aside and compel the attorney to pay costs.
The exercise of this jurisdiction is over the
attorney as an officer of the courtrather than as a mere
member of the profession. As the court has by its
judicial act clothed him with his professional franchise
it is within the inherent power of the courtwhen the
attorney either by moral or professional delinquency
has shown himself unfit t) hold the responsible or-ice,
to strike his name from the roll of attorneys. "This is
indispensible to protect the courtthe administration of
justiceand themselves." (Weeks on Attys.p.140; People
v.Allison 68 Ill. 151; In re Goodrich 79 111.148.) This
power of removal from the bar is possessed by all courts
which have authority to admit attorneys to practice.
But although possessing such inherent power the act of
suspension or striking from the rollsis of so serious
and weighty natureas to require the most deliberate
action and sound discretion. On this point we have
the voice of the Supreme Court of the land through the
words of Mr.Justice Field. Speaking of the power he
said; "It is a power which should be exercised only for
the most weighty reasonsjsuch as would render the con-
tinuance of the attorney in practice incompatible with
a proper respect of the court for itself,or a proper re-
gard for the integrity of the profession",and in con-
clusion he said- "A removal from the bar should there-
fore,never be decreed where any punishment less severe -
such as reprimand, temporary suspension, or fine - would
accomplish the end desired.u (Bradley v.Fisher 13 Wall.
335) The end to be attained is protection rather
than punishment.
In the atter of Eldridge (82 N.Y.I61,167) the
Court of Appeals confirmed an order forbidding Eldridge
from practicing law for three years for the offense of
perjury and subornation of perjury in procuring and pre-
senting to a surrogatea fraudulent deposition of a witR
ness taken on a commiission. Finch J.,with his usual
adroitness and precisionsaid; "our duty to an honorable
profession, the need of preserving unsullied that high
standard of truth and purity by which alone an officer
of justice should be measured, demands of us a cold and de
liberate scrutiny,and firmness in declaring its result.
x x x x x His professional life is full of adver-
saries. Alw:ays in front of him there is an antagonist,
someti.es angry and occasionally bitter and venomous.
His duties are delicate and responsible and easily sub-
ject to misconstruction. The question is important and
it is best that we decide it". Continuing he states
the rule thus; 'He may confess~he may explain~he may
deny. If he confesses the court may at once render its
judgnent. If he explainsthe court may deem the ex-
planation sufficient or the reverse. But if he meets
the accusation with denialthe issue thus raised is to
be triedsuml arily it is true,by the court itselfor
by a referee but never-the-less to he triedand on that
trial the accused is not to be buried under affidavits
or swamped with hearsay evidencebut is entitled to
confront the witnessesto subject them to cross-examina-
tion~and to invoke the protection of wise and settled
rules of evidence",and we may addmust have notice of
the grounds of complaint and citation offering him am-
ple opportunity to confess)explain,or defend.
To justify striking an attorney's name from the
roll the charge must be something affecting his con-
duct as officer of the court and not merely his every-
day conduct as a private citizen; it must amount to a
series of deceitful acts or a loss of moral or profes-
sional character. (People v.Allison supra.; In re Percy
36 N.Y.653) But these facts once appearing,for exarwple,
when triere can be no reliance upon his word or oathhe
is manifestly disqualifiedand the courts not only have
the power but it is their duty as well,to strike his
name from the roll of attorneys. It must also be a
charge affecting his motive and not merely his knowledge
of law which, in itselfis not adequate cause to justify
disbarment. It must be an act cor:initted within the
pale of his professional office and employment.
Impossible as it is to lay down any specific rules
which clearly define the grievousness of the offense
which will justify the court in striking an attorney's
name from the roll,as a generic rule it may be said
that any act cosumiaated by hinwithin the scope of his
profession)which would render his continuance in prac-
tice incompatible vith a proper respect of the court
for itselfor a proper regard for the integrity of the
profession and the administration of justice - in
briefany breach of moral or professional fidelity
which shows, him unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with
the powers and duties of his office,will justify and
even commend the court in ordering his name stricken from
the rolls. With this general rule in mindwhat will
justifyor rather invite,a disbarment is a matter of
sound judicial discretion.
The trouble lies in the fact that in our courts
of original jurisdiction they,having usually witnessed
the act of offense,ate apt to be unjustly prejudiced.
But our courts of appeal will proceed with all possible
precaution,and where the court below has overstepped its
jurisdiction in the matter,rmandamus will lie and is the
appropriate remedy to reinstate him to his professional
office. (Ex parte Bradley 7 Wall.364.)
Following disbarment we are to notice suspension
from the bar; and it is only necessary to say that the
words above applying to disbarment are equally applicable
to suspension which is a remedy for offenses of a. less
grievour nature; in the words of Field J.,ua removal frcm
the bar should never be decreed where any punishment less
severe - such as reprimand,temporary suspensionor fine -
would accomplish the end desired.u
Suimnary jurisdiction also extends to compelling the
attorney to disclose the whereabouts and occuration of
his clientin obedience to a subpoena duces tecum to
deliver up documents coming into his handsand,upon ap-
plication of the client,to compel him by attachment,to
pay over money collected by him on behalf of the client;
but this is a matter of judicial discretion. (Schell v.
The Mayor 128 N.Y.67.))
Equally as important is their power to summarily
proceed in cases of contempt. For the performance of
any act inconsistent with his relation to the court (as
insult,toor disobedience to the order of,the court) or
fidelity to his clientwhich results in any material
wrong by which the court has suffered insult or diso-
bedience,and the client suffered danmagerespectively,
the attorney is liable to proceedings for contempt.
The remedy for contempt is either by way of attachment
or fine and penaltythe distinction being a mere matter
of practice; in cases of contempt agjainst t ,e court in
person resort is had tc fine and penalty~while in cases
of contempt resulting in pecuniary damage result is had
to attachment bringing the attorney corporally before the
court that he may do the thing required or show caiuse
why he has not or snould not. "Contemptu as defined
by one eminent jurist," is a disobedience to the court,
by acting in opposition to the authority,justiceand
dignity thereof." It is either direct or consequential,
for exampledisobedience to an injunction of the court,
and infidelity to the client,respectively. (2 Swift's
Dig.of Com.358) The following illustrations will
serve to show the care with which attorneys must con-
duct themselves and avoid placing themselves in direct
opposition of the prerogative of the court: A petition
for rehearing contained the following statement;'how or
why the honorable connissioner should iiave so effectual-
ly and substantially ignored and disregarded the uncon-
tradicted testimony we do not know.mX x x x x a more
disingenuous and misleading statement of the evidence
could not well be made. x x x The decision seems to us
to be a travesty of the evidence. ' In this case the
attorney purged himself of any contemptuous intent but
nevertheless the court fined him two hundred dollars
for contempt. (McCormick v.Sheridan (Cal.) 20 Pac.24)
In the late case of The Matter of Goff before
Recorder Smythe of New York City attorney Goff was
fined two hundred dollars for alluding to the Recorder's
"remarkable memory" which always helped the prosecution
and hurt the defense (referring to the fact that the
Recorder had assisted the memory of a witness when Mr.
Goff was testing it.) Acts or words when stated in
writing,may appear to have been entirely innocent,but
may have been done or spoken in such a manner as to have
been in the highest degree a breach of the respectful
conduct due to courts when in the discharge of their
dutiesand of the decorum arl good order that ought to
be observed in their presence to enable them to properly
perfon their functions. An attorney trying the cause
of his client hasof course,rights as to the representa-
tive of a suitor and as an officer of the court whichi
iust be respected; but those rights can never extend
to disagreeing or disobeying the authority, justice,
dignityor deeorum of the court.
(Leftwilch v.District Court (t,inn.J42 N.W.598.)
Again has the Federal Supreme Court found occasion
to speak,and in conclusion we quote from tne words of
Field J.: The power to punish for contempt is inherent
in all courts; its existence is necessary to the preser-
vation of orderin judicial proceedingsand to the enforce
ment of judgmentsorders and writs of the courtand
consequently to the due administration of justice. The
moment the courts of the United States were called into
existence and invested with jurisdiction over any sub-
ject they become possessed of this power." (Ex parte
Robinson 19 Wall. 505.)
CHAPTER III.
The Law of Attorney and Client.
Retainer - Authority - Appearance - Effect
of unauthorized Appearance - Doctrine of
Noyes v.Denton - Resume.
We now direct our attention to the most important
division of our subjectthe Law of Attorney and Client,
which finds its basis in the correlative rights and
duties incumbent upon them by virtue of their relation
as atorney ard clienta relation characterized by the
utmost honesty and fidelity,the very essence of the re-
lation,and without which justice would be hampered and
diverted. How could it be otherwise when property and,as
often, life, liberty, and reputation are at stake ? For
without this fiduciary seal,uberrimae fideiit is idle
to hope for that which, in tae eye of the law,is its
aim, the promotion of justice. It is a relation
founded upon the utmost good faith.
To discuss these relationstheir incidentsand the
law governing them)in their natural and logical order
let us assume that the client is about to retain his
attorney for the trial of a caasetreating them in their
natural and usual order as they arise in the trial of tie
ordinary cause.
The suitor seeks his counsel and "lays his case,"
whatever it may beby a statement of the facts in the
caseand from thence a quasi relation of attorney and
client exists. Finding the cause .eritorious and the
client desirous of employing himand the attorney agree-
ing to actthe retainer is complete and he is clothed
with all the indicia of the relation;from that instant
the relation of attorney and client is absolute and re-
lates back to the time of laying the ease. The retainer
may be defined generally to be a mutual contract founded
upon the utmost good faith, the one to act as attorney
and the other to accept his services. There are two
essentials to the ret.ainer,viz., (1) The agreement of the
attorney to act as such for the partyand (2) the agree-
ment of the party to have the other for an attorney.
(Weeks on Att'ys.p.328).
But the retainer may be either express or implied,parol
or written-but as a matter of aafety,convenienceand
good practice it is never to be forgotten,that it is best
in all cases to have a written retainer signed by the
client. The great importance of this will be seen
later when the question is askedis the judgaent good,
did the attorney have authority ? The contract of re-
tainer may be either special,as to put in a special
appearance,or generalto conduct a proceeding from
the beginning to its termination.
Deserving of a passing remark is the right to
counsel by suitors. Prior to 1688 in England in
criminal offenses of a high nature,as felonies and treas-
ons,the right was denied. Mr.Weeks commenting upon it,
says: 'Persons ignorant and unaccustomed to public as-
serbliesperhaps feeble in body or intellect,or in both,
were put upon trial on charges which might consign them
to the'most ignominious deathwith able counsel opposed
and all the machinery of the law in active operation
against them,and yet refused the right. But suffice
it to say that now such a barbarous practice is not in
vogue and suitors arV accorded to the fullest extent the
right of counsel.
Not uncoimnon is the retainer of a law firm by the
client,and the question arises as to the effect of a
dissolution of such partnership upon the retainer. In-
asmuch as the contract of retainer of a law firm is an
entire contract,and ii-poses a joint and several liability
upon them,neitner a dissolution of the partnership nor
any secret agreement between the attorneys can affect
the contract. The dissolution only affects their
professional business undertaken after such dissolution
and cannot relate back and affect the contracts entered
into prior thereto. ' A dissolution of a partnership
subsisting between attorneys,has reference to new busi-
ness to be undertaken,and does not affect engagements
already madeat least so far as their clients are con-
cerned. The rights of suitors imperiously demand this.
And the same principle is also applicable to their in-
dividual engagements when forming a partnership. (Walker
v.Goodrich 16 Ill.34)
By virtue of his license he has a right to appear
for any suitor who may retain him ,and by virtue of his
retainer has a general locense to appear for the particu-
lar person,the legal presumption always being in his
favor. And only in cases which justify grave doubts
do the courts require hiLl to produoe special authority.
An authorized appearance by the attorneyin good faith,
gives perfect jurisdiction over the suitorand his sub-
sequent action is conclusive against the suitor both in
law and equity. This is not doubted.
But the effect of an UNAUTHORIZED APPEARANCE pre-
sents another and most interesting anid important ques-
tion. What is the effect of a judgment in such a
case ? Does it bind the client and to what extent ? Is
it void,voidableor conclusive ? Who may attack such
a judgment ? Is the pecuniary responsibility of the
attorney a controling or misleading factor in the solu4
tion ? In seeking to solve these problems we will con-
fine our attention chiefly to New York cases,for it is
believed that better satisfaction can be given by treat-
ing definitely of the law in our own state merely,in
view of the limited space that can be here devoted to
its discussion.
Noyes v.Denton (9 Johnson 296) From this leading
case in 1810, there originated what is known in this
state as the "Doctrine of Noyes v.Denton," which strictly
applied the rule that an unauthorized appearance by a
responsible atorney is binding upon the person for whom
he appeared even though the person gave the attorney
absolutely no authority ani may have been ignorant of
the very existence of the suit)not having been served
with processand that for any injury resulting to hiLt
therefrom such person must pursue the attorney to re-
cover. But to this exueptions were made if there was
any fraud or collusion between the attorney and the
other partyand in case the attorney was insolvent.
Chancellor Kent in writing the opinion remarked that "tne
case may not seem correct if we reason from first prin-
ciples." It was assailed by Johnson J.in Williams v.
Van Valkenburg (16 How. Pr.144) as unjust in principle
although he says,*l do not)howeverpropose at this day
to abrogate the rule as it now stands."
The doctrine was ignored in the case of Allen v.
Stone (10 Barb. 5-7) In this case one Chalmers hired
someone to trump up an account in favor of Stone against
Allen 2he then began suit against Allen in the name of
Stoneappeared before the justice as Stone's attorney
aid swore to hiE authority to appear. But this was
false. He obtained judgment againLt Allen, the case
was appealed to Conijvon Pleas and Chalmers retained an
attorney to defend the writ of error,the writ of error
was set asidejudgment affirmed and execution issued.
On petition of the defendant showing the facts this
court reversed the rule setting aside tnae writ of error
and the judgment of the Courion Pleas reversed with costs.
The question arose,was the plaintiff Stone bound by the
unauthorized appearance of Chalmers and liable for costs.
We quote at length the irresistable reasoning and con-
clusion of Hand J. 'That a man's rights may be af-
fected,and he, perhapsruined by the act of an
attorney whom he never employedand may never have know,
and without any notice whatever,is a position that must
be sustained,if at all,by maere force of authority.
It has no foundation in reason or justiceis intolerable
in practiceand contrary to a fundamental principle that
every 1an should have a day in court before he is con-
demned. It also violates another principlethat one
cannot act for another without authority express or
implied. And it is pretty difficult to see why the
one for whom the attorney professes to act,and not he
that deals with the pretended agent,should be turned
over to the latter for redress~thereby reversing the
ordinary rule in such cases. By what reasoning can a
solvent attorney be said to be retained and an insolvent
one not ? His solvency has nothing to do with the re-
tainer. And why should one who in fact has never been
in courtand is ignorant of the very existence of the
suitbe responsible,as against one who has throughout
been an actual party litigant ?R The plaintiff was
held for costs only from the time he had notice and op-
portunity to defend. It is difficult to see how the
learned judge's argument can be answered -is it not
conclusive in logic ?
But notwithstanding the Court of Appeals have reach
ed a different conclusion. In Alexander v.Livinjston
(37 N.Y.502) when an attorney prosecuted an action
of ejectment in the name of the grantors and grantee),at
the grantee's request,and without the knowledge or con-
sent of the grantors~against the defendant in adverse
possession when the deed was made,an4 the recovery was
denied vith costs,)the cour+ decreed that the grantors
were liable to the defendants in costs, notwithstanding
such prosecution was without their knowledge and con-
sentand solely at the instance of the grantee. Woodruff
J.in writing the opinionsaid; "It would be at variance
with the scheme and plan upon which we universally ad-
minister the law,if a defendant could be prosecuted by a
responsible attorney,in full authority to practice in the
courtsand after successfully and in good faith de-
fendedas the case might be,through all the tribunals of
justiceand to final judgment in the court of last resor
oe required to submit to an order setting aside the
proceedingsjand be left to again be prosecuted for the
same cause of action,on +he mere ground that the attorney
had no authority from the plaintiff to bring the action.0
Now that sounds well but we would like to askwhat more
conclusive ground could be imagined why an agent should
not actthan that he had no authoritywas in fact no a-
gent at all ? Which would be the greater hardship, to
compel the defendant to submit to an order setting
aside the unauthorized proceeding,or to compel the so-
called plaintiff,ignoratlt of the existence of the case,
to pay the costs in such a proceeding ? Why ought not
the party who has been subjected to an unauthorized
litigation pursue the offending attorney, rather than
cast that hazard and burden upon on who has done
nothing to deserve it,who has given no consent, and who
has not been in court,no,not even knows that such a
case existed until a bill of costs was thrust upon him ?
The learned judge says, "the answer lies in the sugges-
tion already made,that the law warrants a party in giv-
ing faith and confidence to one,who,by law,is authorized
to hold himself out as a public officer,clothed with
power to represent others in court." But the answer is
altogether untenable. As we have already seen the
attorney is not a public officer. His license does
not give him the right to appear for any suitor,but only
those who see fit to retain him;and until such retainer
is complete,until its essential elements are present,
until their minds have met and agreed, there is absolute-
ly no authority in the attorney to appear - clearly
the learned judge misapprehended the situation.
The question was fairly before the court in Brown
v.Nichols (42 N.Y.26) and the court said (Smith,Ingalls
and Grover J.J.,dissenting),"we think it ought to be the
settled law of the state,that the judgment may stand."
The doctrine of Denton v.Noyesunfortunately,is
without question the established law of this state. In
the last case before the Court of AppealsVilas v.P.& M.
R.R. Co. (123 N.Y.440),the court in the words of Andrews,
J.,commented upon the doctrine as followsafter admitting
the injustice of the doctrine; 'But it has been followed
and must be regarded as the law of the state. We are
bound under decisions to follow the doctrine in cases
where it is strictly applicable. It is to such cases
stare decicis. But we are not disposed to extend the
doctrine to cases fairly and reasonably distinguishable,
and the fact that a defendant, against whom a judgment
has been obtained here upon the authorized appearance by
an attorney,ani who was not served,was a non-resident
during the pendency of the proceedings,and was not with-
in the jurisdiction,does,we think,constitute such a dis-
tinction as renders the rule in that case inapplicable.
Justices Courts,not being courts of record know no
attorneys at law,but all persons who appear there for
suitors are mere agents or attorneys in fact,hence the
doctrine of Noyes v.Denton does not apply in those court;,
and a judgment on an unauthorized appearance is a nullity.
(Sperry v.Reynolds 65 7.Y.179.)
The latest and most important innovation of the
doctrine is seen in the late case of Post v.Charles-
worti (21 N.Y.Supp.168). A firm of attorneys appeared,
without authorityfor a married woman, having an in-
choate right of dower, in an action for partition,
and judgment was rendered against the plaintiffs. She
moved for an order compelling the attorneys to pay the
judgment and save her harmless. The court granted this
motion and ordered the attorneys to pay the judgment,
and said; 'If the parties can protect all the parties
who have any rights in the premises)without driving them
to the annoyance) trouble and expense of an action it
should do so.4 In this case it was the plaintiffs'
only remedy short of an action against the attorneys
directly.
With all due deference to ttat great and profound
jurist who originated the doctrine,it seens to us to be
unsound reasoning anA altogether a harsh and unjust doc-
trine. The proposition tiat,by the admission of the
court to practice as an attorney,power is conferred
upon him to confer jurisdiction upon the court as to all
mankindby his appearance,without any authority whatever
thereforis a proposition destitute of reason
and at variance with all the analogies of the law as
scarcely to be capable of discussion. On the ground
that- the suitor invariablyappears by attorney,and the
mere prima facie presumption that the attorney's appear-
ance is authorizedthey argue that the appearance of the
attorney is legal as to the court and the opposing
party. But this is begging the whole question. The
courts also insist that the rule is required on the broad
ground of public policy; that without itneither the
court nor opposite party could relywith entire safety,
upon the validity of the appearance of an attorney.
How far public policy may be made to expandin the
hands of an ingenious judgewe do not knownor will we
attempt to say; but the question comes to this,so far as
policy is concerned,is it not better to require the
opposite party to inquire into the power of an attorney
v ,hen there is any possible doubt,before any injury has
arisen from his acts,in case he does not possess it,or
to hold a party bound by a judgment in an action,of the
existence of which he is ignorant,and by the result of
which he may be ruined ? Again it is insisted that the
cases will be of rare occurence; this may be true,
but this afford1s but little consolation to a person ir-
reparably injured by a judgment in an action of which
he iLs known nothing. The injustice remains the same
when applied to the particular case. The stamp of
approval given this doctrine is nothing short of paving
the way for the consummation of an act,for the abuse of
which, the attorney's name may be stricken from the roll,
not to mention the fact that it is contrary to that
great lanidmark in the protection of constitutional right;
that uno person shall be deprived of life,liberty or
property without due process of law. 0 "The antiquity
of the doctrine neither commands my respect nor excites
my admiration. It is in derogation of the rule that a
man does nothing when he acts neither in person nor by
agent or attorney duly authorized. It is subversion
of his right of defense and trial by juryand strips
from him the protection of the doctrine that his property
shall not be taken save by the judgment of his peers. U
(Bean v.Mather 1 Daly 440) It transgresses every car-
dinal rule of agency as well as the first principles
of justice.
To this doctrine there is an exception. As was
said in one case the court will Oset aside the judgment
if the attorney was a beggar or a suspicious character.
If, howeveran attorney willintentionally confess judg-
ment against a partywithout the least color of authori-
tydoes not fall within the dcscription,"suspicious
cnaracter",it is difficult to ima "ine one that will.
It is also to be remembered that the reason given by the
courtsin saying that they would Set aside the judgment
if the attorney was insolventisthat otherwise the
client might be injured. But to this it has been sug-
gested~that an attorney who is base enough to confess a
judgment against another,knowingly, and without the least
shadow of authority,will very easily,by flight or fraud,
elude both the power of the courts to punish himand
the payment of any damages that might be recovered
against him.
In conclusion we voice the words of Judge Van Ness
dissenting in Noyes v.Denton: 'If' it be once understood
to be the law of the land,that every attorney of this
court may appear for any man in the coimunity,whether
he be suer or notand confess valid Judgment against him,
without his knowledge or cons ent,whereby his person
may be taken in executionor his property swept avay,
without giving him an oppurtunity to prepare for the
shock,I speak with all Jue deferenceI tremble for the
consequences. The whlle profession instead of being
what it yet is,honored and respeotedwillI fearsoon be
considered,in fact to be what a part has already been
calledhostes humani generis."
From the origin of the doctrine down to the late
case of Post v.Charlesworth its application has been
traced,and we mlust accept the law as it is found ac-
tually existingand not as we would like it. And from
the above cases we will endeavor to deduce the princi-
ples to a few convenient rules:
1. An unauthorized appearance by an attorney will
confer jurisdiction upon the court over the person in
whose name he appears,subject to the following rules.
2. The unauthorized appearance of an attorney is bind-
ing upon the person for whom he appearseven though sucn
personwas not served with process,gave the attorney no
authority,and was ignorant of the existence of the suit.
Exceptions. (1) Wnere there is fraud or colluss:ion be-
tween the attorney and the opposite party,or (2) where
the attorney is insolvent,the proceedings will be set
aside. (3) Proceedings had on such an appearance in a
Justices Court are a nullity. (4) When such person not
served with process~is a non-resident of the state
during the perrency of the proceedingsand is not within
the jurisdictionthe proceedings will be set aside.
3. When the suitor has been injured by such appear-
ance his remedy is by an action agaiinst the offending
attorney. Exceptions. (1) In proper casese.g.,unauth-
orized appearance in a partition suit where all the
rights of all parties interested can be protected the
courtin its discretion,will order the attorney to pay
the judgment and costs and save such person harmless.
(2]. N.Y. Supp. 168.)
4. The proper proceedings preliminary to relief in the
above cases is by direct apnlication to the aourt,by mo-
tion, in the action in which the unauthorized appearance
was entered,asking)that the proccelings be set aside)
judgment opened with opportunity to defendor an order
granted compelling the attorney to pay the judgment and
costs,as the case may be. (See cases above cited)
5. It should be remembered as an appendix to each of
the above rulesthat the doctrine has been given a litit-
ed construction and that the courts will on all possible
occasions limit its applications,in reasonable cases.
CHAPTER IV.
Powers by virtue of Retainer other than Ap-
pearance - Agency - Management of Suit - Ex-
tent of - Solemn Adamissions-Compromises -
Submission to Arbitration - Service of Notice-
Effect Judgment on Retainer - Delegating Trust-
Termination of Relation.
The power of the attorney to appear generally
for a suitor and thus confer jurisdiction upon the
court,having been discusscflwe are next to examine his
rights and duties in the preparation, conduct and trial
of the cause. And in doing so we are always to reflect
that it is a fiduciary relation merging from a contract
and governed by the principles of Agency, but it is here
preferred to call it an agency proper: for the better
opinion is that without deputed power,either express or
iiplied,the attorney at law has no better right to act
than an attorney in fact. Assuming such authority
what is its scope ? Their autlOrity is exceptionally
extensive,includinj not only that which ixpressly given
by the letter of the retainerbut that which is legally
implied from the nature of the employmnent. It extends
in fact to everything that is necessary for the accom-
plishment of the acts for wnich he is retained: to per-
form- all acts which, through his superior knowledge
of the lawhe may decide to be legalproper and neces. ary
in the trial of the particular causefrom its beginning
to its final deteraination. It covers all acts done,
either in or out of courtnecessary or incidental to
the prosecution and management of the suitjand which
affect the proceedure and remedyonlyand not the cause
of action. By necessity his authority is liberally
construed; for he acts in many instances of doubt and
discretionand exigencies are likely to arise,in the pro-
gress of the causethat demand the exercise of discretion
when there is no opportunity to consult with a client,
and he is sometimes obliged to act upon reasons which,
at the time,cannot be explained; and it is only a just
implication that the authority of the attorney extends
to the management of the cause in all the exigencies
which arise during its progress. To illustrate : he may
sue out the neces. ary writs,prepare the complaint,sub-
mit to arbitration, take an appeal,demand paymentof judg-
ment,direct and control executionand make admilssions
in the trial of the causeand the like. But he cannot
compromise the claim,release a party,assign the cause of
action nor stipulate not to take an appeal. The at-
torney then has general autliority to Afind his client in
all things coming within his province as an attorney.
And even though the act be injudicious,if made in the
usual course of practice it is absolutely. binding upon
tne client in regard to his dealings with the opposite
party. The grounds of fraud collusionand want of
jurisdiction alone are defences. Indeed this has been
the rule from an early day for we find it stated in
Glanville (Beames's Ed.Chap.IV ) as follows: "The prin-
cipal is to be distrained *o abide by what has been done
by his attorneywhether it be so done by judgment or by
record." The rule is now well settled that 'an at-
torney is the representative of his client in courtis
authorized to commence and conduct that cause to final
judgment and execution,and to do whatever is usual and
ieeessary to bring about that ei-,through all the forms
and stages of legal proceedings.u (Derwort v.Loomis,21
Conn. 2,i4)
During the progress of the trial tne attorney
may make "solemn admissions" and bind his client. But
to have binding force they must be made strictly within
his professional capacity and in the due course of pro-
ceedings. Unsolemn admissions or those made in casual
conversation are not binding upon the client. In order
to bind the client they should be distinct,formaland
made for tae express purpose of dispensing with formal
proof of facts at the trial. The distinction is found
in the nature and extent of his authorityhe being re-
tained to manage the cause anrd nothing -.,ore - hence ad-
missions not made to that end are inadmissable.
(Treadway v.Company 40 Ia.526; I Greenl.Ev.sec.186;
Stephen's Ev.Chace's Ed.n.47)
Naturally the next and important question would be
asked,can an attorney compromise his client's cause of
action and discharge it without special authority ?
The rule in England is that a coiipromiseOona fide, pru-
dent arrI beneficial to the clientand not made in de-
fiance of his instructions,will be sustained. But the
rule in the nited States may be said to be settled,
that an attorney by virtue of his general retainer merely
without special authorityexpress or implied,has no right
whatever to compromise his client's cause of action,
notwithstanding some dicta and many loose statements to
the contrary. In Preston v. Hill (50 Cal.43) the
court said :'That in the United States the rule)as set-
tled by an almost uniform current of authorities,is that
an attorneyby virtue merely of his retainer as such,
and without express authority from his clienthas not
the power to bind the client by the compromise of a
pending action." In Weeks on Attorneys (sec.228),com-
menting upon this caseit is said that the court is
clearly in error as to there being any"uniforn current of
authorities" ,and that there are numerous cases to the
codniraryciting several cases. But not one of those
cases support this contention. But in one case the
court casually remarks that they would not hesitate to
say that an attorney has such power; but this was purely
a dictum. We have failed to findin any of the re-
ports a case holding that an attorney has the authority
by virtue of his general retainer, to compromiP'e iis
client's cause of action. The rule is aptly stated
in the words of Ellsworth J.thus: uThe general question
of the authority of an attorneyhas oftenbeen discussed
in courts of justiceand many cases are to be found in
which distinctionsof more or less importance,have been
taken. But in none of them is it heldthat an attorney,
who is clothed with no other authority than what is in-
cidental to his retainer,can compromise and discharge
the claim.' (Derwert v.Loomer 21 Conn.244,245) On
what imaginable theory can it be said that an attorney
can compromise his client's cause by authority flowing
impliedly from his general retainerwhen oy the very
nature of the retainer , he is to prosecute the cause
to final judgment an execution ? All these loose
statements by judges and text writers as to bona fide
compromises binding the client,and those stating the test
to bedid the attorneyin making the settlementact as
good and diligent men of his class are accustomed to act,
are incorrectmisleading,and contrary to the principles
and theory of agency,as well as the overwhelming and
uniform current of authorities throughout the country.
There is no such thing,known to the lawas a negligent
compromiseall compromises made withiout special authority
are negligent.
Althoug~h it is well settled tnat the attorney
cannot co,,.iromise the client's cause of actionyet it is
as well settled that he can submit the cause to arbitra-
tion and bind nis client tnerebyeven without his con-
sent or knowledge. In 1813 the question came before
the Federal Supreme Court and Marshall Ch.J.,said;
"It is believed to be the practice throughout the Union
for suits to-be referred by consent of counsel without
special authority. Were it otherwisecourts could not
justify the permission which they always grantto enter
a rule of reference (to arbitration) when consented to
by the counsel on both sides." (Halker v.Parker,7 Crancn
436). This is merely one legal mode of trying the
disputed question, to which the client's cause may be suu-
mIitted because it is a mode of which the courts approve.
But he cannot submit the cause to arbitration when no
suit is pending; nor can ie by any agreement in pais.
It must be submitted in the cause in a fonial manner.
An authority to act in pais could only be inferred if it
existed at all,from his employment before the institution
of the suit as attorneyand such employment confers no
such authority. (Daniels v.New London 58 Conn.15G) That
an attorney is clothed with the power to formally submit
the case to arbitration, is attested by an almost unbroken
series of decisions. Incidental to the general
authority to act in all the exigencies of the case,seems
to be his power to stipulate that the plaintiffs cause
of action shall not abate with his death before final
judgment. (Cox v.R.R.Co. 63 N.Y.414)
One of the principal rights as well as.duties of an
attorney is to receive service of notice of any step
taken in the proceeding; in fact he is the proper person
on whom to serve such a notice. Ar notice to him is
notice to his client~for the reason that he is one stand-
ing in the place or stead of his client. And resting
on the same basis is the well settled rulethat an at-
torney has authorityby virtue of his retainerto demand
and receive payment of his client's money; and again
payment to the attorney is payment to the client. But
he cannot receive anything but money in payment of the
debt.
His rights and duties thus defined, the question
arises,what is the effect of judgiment upon his retainer ?
When does his authority terminate ? We have handed down
to us,an old common law rule that with the entry of final
judgment,the authority of the attorney is revokedexcept
that for a year air a day he may enforce the judgment by
execution. This has never been strictly followed.
His general powers cease with judgment,but there remains
the mere power to control the execution; thushis powers
are reduced to one particularnamely the enforcemient of
executionbut as to that he has complete control in every
respect. (78 Md.225)
Throughout these numerous acts we have seen tnat
the client imposes upon the attorney a confidence and
special trust of a personal nature; that the relation is a
On this account he cannot delegate hisfiduciary one.
trust nor substitute another in his stead~without special
consent from the client. He can employ subordinates
and delegate the ministerial actsbut he cannot delegite
his professional discretionconfidence or trust. But
with the client's consent he can employ associate counsel
or appoint a substitute at the client's expense.
Already we have had occasion to remark that the
attorney's authority continues until the final termina-
tion of the cause; but the client may terminate it be-
forejand so may the attorney after reasonable noticebut
in the absence of proof to the contrary,the presumption
is that it continues until the litigation is finally ter-
minated. Their relations may be prematurely severed
by the death of either attorney or client~or by any cause
which perwanently incapacitates the attorney from per-
forming his professional functions.
CHAPTF>?, V.
Duties towardand Dealings with the Client.
Degree of Good Faith etc.- Duties in prepar-
ing for trial - Reasonableness of Fee -
Dealings with Client - Purchases pendente
lite - Duty in procuring Title - Rendering
Accounts.
Principles,which guide the attorney in the
fulfillment of his trust and which restrain him in his
dealings with his client,are quite as important,and even
more delicate than,any we have yet discussed-and they
are next to be examined.
It is hardly necessary to reiterate the degree of
fidelity existing in the relation,but it is the controll-
ing element which determines the destinies of each tran-
saction between attorney and client. The very highest
degree of fairness and good faith are essential;and all
dealings between the client and his legal adviser will be
searched with jealous scrutiny,and the courts will,when
the slightest opportunity offers itself)relieve the
client from the results of any undue influence. The
attorney is bound to the "most scrupulous good faith.'
All cou iunicatioris made to him in the furtherance of the
cause are stanped with the seal of inviolable secrecy,
and under no circumstances should they be disclosed; a
breach of this rule would be considered inconsistent
with moral as well as professional decorum.
The first duty of the attorney is to notify his
client of all adverse retainers or interests which might
in any v~ay prejudice his own discretionor the rights of
tne client. The client has a right to expect thisfor
otherwise his interests would be subjected to the great-
est peril.
The attorney ought,as soon as practicable,to make
a careful investigation of all the facts in the case and
inforn himself of the evidence by a careful personal pe-
rusal; by conrunications with his client-by the examina-
tion of witnessesdocuments and all the papers in the
case. He ought not always to 'be content with the
client's version of the case,nor proceed upon mere hear-
say, sugjestion, or suspicionbut make a personal investi-
gation of all possible prooftaking down in writing all
the important testimony in the form of a brief of facts.
In some cases a full preliminary investigation should be
insisted upon, even though the client may desire to dis-
pense with it,and especially when the contemplated cause
is of a penal nature. Experience has taught,that all
assertions of rightsall claims and demaiids,out of the
ordinary course,require extra-ordinary care ard investi-
gation,on the part of those professionally engaged,be-
fore lending their aid to enforce them. "If' attorn -
eys would sift the eviden:e to the very bottom in support
of claims they are asked to enforce or resist,before
lending the sanction of - legal proceedingsmuch trumpery
litigation would be avoidedand many scandalous imputa-
tions and glaring attempts at fraud and extortion choked
at the very outset, to the great benefit of the coadunity
and the honor and cre-it of the profession."
Before instituting the suit,consideration should
be had: (1) As to the most appropriate and effectual
remedy or redress,and (2) to the requitite notices and
steps necessary to cormence the action. One should
know his case even more intimately than he does the law
which governs it; he should know beforehand every point
that is to be made and exactly what evidence can be pro-
duced in its support; he should have a definite theory
of his case. He aught also to examine and cross-examine
his witnesses and reduce the prcof to as nearly a cer-
tainty as may be before the trial. "The machinery of
trials," says Reed,"will run with far less friction if
witnesses and counsel understand each other in advance. U
The history of all great cases,of profound and irresist-
able argument,arnd of brilliant victories at the bar,re-
veals but a reproduction of the counsel's familiarity
with his case.
To these suggestions,which would be incomplete
withoutmay be added an equally as important one; never
advise a client that his cause is a meritorious one,
worthy of litigatingprimarily for the fee to be derived
from it. If there is any one hindrance to justice
deserving more than another of censure,with the lower
class of the profession,this is the most iniquitous.
It prejudices the layman and he learns to distrust the
justice of the law,the respect of the cou.rt,and the
integrity of the profession. So also should the
fee never be exorbitant or extortionate. In the words
of one learned lawyer, "the morality of a lawyer may be
measured by the reasonableness of his fees." He ought
always to conduct himself so as not even to admit a
suspicion that he falls within Lord Brougham's definition
of an attorney as "a learned gentleman who gets the
property of one man out of the hands of another,and
xeeps it himself." Besides professional devotion and
integrity,he should treat his client with that courtesy
and respect that might be expected from a member of the
honorable profession.
The nature of the relation of attorney and client,
as a general ruleforms a considerable objection to any
collateral dealings between the two during its contin-
uance. In the legal sense there is so great an inequal-
ity between the transacting parties,so much habitual
exercise of power on the one side and habitual submission
on the other,that the courts impute an exercise of undue
influence and hence all such dealings undergo a jealous
scrutiny by the court;especially is that so in a court
of equity. This is becauSe of the opportunityin some
cases amounting to invitation almostto avail himself
of the clients necssities,gratuity,liberality or credu-
lity,and of his influence over him,to his own personal
advantage. Hencein all cases of gifts)conveyancesor
contracts,from the client to the attorney,there is a
strong presumption against them and the onus is upon the
attorney to show,to the satisfaction of the courtthat
the dealings were in entire good faith,open and unpre-
judiced. The rule is thus stated: 'the attorney who
bargains,in a matter of advantage to himself,with his
clientis bound to show that the transaction is fair and
equitable; that he fully and faithfully discharged his
duties to his client without misrepresentation or con-
cealment of any fact material to the client; that the
client was fully informed of his rights and interests in
the subject matter of the transactionand of the nature
and effect of the contractsale,or gift,and was so placed
as to be able to deal with his attorney at arms length.'
(Weeks on Attorneys sec.268.) And it is said in
Tyrrell v.The Bank of London (10 H.L.C.26,43) that uthere
is no relation known to societyof the duties of which it
is more incumbent upon a court of justice to strictly
require a faithful and honorable observance,than the
relation between solicitor and client."
The rule is applied when the attorney takes a se-
curity from his client or when he bargains for a greater
compensafion than when first retained. So in cases
of purchase,pendente lite,of property from the clientard
the attorney must make a full disclosure of all facts
that might in any way influence the decision of the
court as to their respective rights and interests.
(Youmans v.James,27 Kan.195; Rogers v.Marshall 3 Mc
Creary 76 and note; Payne v.Avery 21 Mch.524,543) An
attorney cannot in any casewithout the clients consent
buy and hold otherwise than in trustany adverse title
or interest touching the thing to which his employment
relates;ani if he does so buy he holds the title for his
client as beneficiarywho may recover the property by
tendering the amount of the purchase money with interest.
(Baker v.Humphrey,101 U.S.494) and,it is almost needless
to add that the attorney cannot acquire conflicting in-
terests to his client by adverse possession while the
relation continues.
Sometimes the attorney is called upon to purchase
or mortgage property for his clientand in such cases
he only undertakes to investigate and insure the legal
requisites of the title - its validity in the eye of the
law - and not its pecuniary value. He may though by
special agreement be imposed with the duty of securing
it in point of value. (Hayne v.Rhodes 2 Queen's Bench
342)
One thing that every good attorney will dois to
render proper and accurate accounts to his client;and,as
he stands not only as agent but in a fiduciary relation,
it is peculiarly imperative that such accounts should be
simple,fair,and accurate; for if there is a shadow of
undue influence cast over the transaction,equity will
open the account even though a long time has elapsed.
We have already seen that the court has power to sumnar-
ily compel the attorney to deliver over money to his
client. As in the case of all trust relations the
attorney should from the beginning keep separate ac-
counts,and never uhder any circumstances mix his funds
with those of his clients;and if he does commingle them,
or fails to keep proper accounts,the legal presumption
is against him,and for any loss occasioned for neglect
e.g. improper entry in his bank books,he is personally
liable. (Nattner v.Dolan 108 Ind.500). The reports
contain not a few painful examples of attorneys who have
negligently commingled their own funds with those of
their clientsand who have been put to great inconven-
ience thereby.
CHAPTER VI.
Liability of Attorney for Negligence.
Degree of care,skillnegligence etc.- What
is a reasonable degree - Gross negligence
and gross ignorance - Liability for - client's
remedy - Compensation v.Negligence - Set off
in New York - Abandoning cause of action.
The indispensable and natural liability of
the attorney for the negligent performance of the duties
we have heretofore examined,we are next to discuss.
The rule is well settled that when an attorney undertakes
to conduct a legal controversy that he professes hiu-
self to be reasonably well acquainted with the law and
the rules of practice of the courts)and that he is bound
to exercise in such proceedings a reasonable degree of
care,prudence, skill and diligence. (Savings Bank v.Viard
100 U.S.195,198) In that case Mr..Justice Clifford said;
'it must not be understood that an attorney is liable
for every mistake that may occur in practiceor that he
may be held responsible to his client for every error
of judgment in the conduct of his client's cause.
Instead of that)the rule is that if he acts with a proper
degree of skilland with reasonable care,anr to the best
of his knowledge,he will not be held responsible . x x
x x x x If he fails in any of these respects ha may,
not only forfeit all claim to compensation, but may also
render himself liable to his client for any damnage he may
sustain from such neglect.' There is no douht that
the test is,whether the attorney has exercised a 'reas-
onable degree" of careskill,diligence,and his best
knowledge; but the difficult question in the particu-
lar case iswhat is a 'reasonable degree" of those
essentials ? And in determining this let it be re-
membered that he has not only absolute control of the
management of the case,its proceedure and remedybut,es-
pecially in the United States where the dual system no
longer exists,a sweeping field of discretionary power,
in the exercise of such control. The best approximate
test that we have been able to find is stated by the
learned judge in the case of the Savings Bank v.Ward,su-
pra,as follows: Unless the client is injured by the de-
ficiencies of his attorney,he cannot maintain an action
for damages;but if he is injured the true rule is that
theattorney is liable for the want of such skillcare,
and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly
possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment." The degree of skill is to be measured
with reference to the particular duty which he undertakes
to perform (Jackson v. Clopton,66Ala. 29). It would be
extremely difficult to determine the exact measure or
degree by which the care,skill,and diligence which an
attorney impliedly undertakes to exercise in the con-
duct of the causeor to indicate precisely the line of
demarcation separateing reasonable skill and diligence
from that crassa negligentiaor lata hulpa,which ex-
poses him to an action for damages. He does not pro-
fess to win the case at all events,nor to know all the
law,but he does profess to exercise a fair,reasonable anid
competent degree of skill. He is held to know the rules
of practicethe ordinary rules of pleading and evidence,
the existence of statutes and rules of courtand their
construction in cases free from doubt,and of natters
which are ordinarily known and exercised in his depart-
ment of the profession, in similar cases. And for a
non-observance of these he would be liable; while on the
other hand he is not held to know points of nice and
doubtful construction, those of new occurencenor thes e
usually entrusted to specialists in his profession. In
the application of these rules each case stands upon its
own peculiar circumstances,remembering always t1at even
judges and tnrie most learned of the profession differ
radically upon points of vast importance. The law is
not an exact science3 there is no attainable degree of
skill or excellence at which differences of opinion or
doubts in respect to questions of law are removedfrom
the minds of lawyers or even judges. He is respon-
sible only when the offense amounts to lata culpa or
crassa negligentia. uHe will be liable if his client's
interests suffer on account of his failure to understan
and apply those rules and principles of la* that are well
established and clearly defined in the elementary books,
or which have been declared in adjudged cases that have
been reported and published at sufficient length of time
to have become known to those who exercise reasonable
diligence in keeping pace with the literature of the
profession.' (Citizens Loan Association v.Friendly,123
Ind.143) But a metropolitan standard is not to be
applied to a rural bar,and it is to be remembered that a
specialist must exercise that skill usually exercised
in his department of the profession. (Wharton on Neg. sec.
750-751). And to some extent local custom may vary the
rule. Whether he is negligent or not is a question
for the jury with proper instruction by the court, except
in California where it is held to be a question for
the court to decide. The same principles apply as well
to mistakes or blunders by the attorney. He may not be
able to summon any more skill,but every attorney can de-
vote the required time,attention,and care to the cause;
and for a want of proper attention the courts deal less
leniently with him. A lack of such attention is gross
negligence. But he is protected by the presumption
that he has diligently discharged his duty,and not only
must gross negligence or ignorance be shown affirmatively
but also their extent and damage to the client. (Staples
v.Staples 85 Va.76.)
-- Client's Remedy.--
It is not within the scope of this thesis to enter
into a minute discussion of the appropriate remedies in
such an action against the attorney,nor particular cases
where they apply,but to give the general rules which will
bring approximate results when applied with discretion
in the light of surrounding circumstances.
A very nice and not altogether settled question
arises in the following inquiry,how far is negligence on
behalf of the attorney a defense to an action for his
fees ? This question is made difficult of solution and
of exact results,because the law is now being developed
and is not entirely settled; besides the different
states so widely differ in their views. But it is be-
lieved that they may be arranged in two classesviz;
firstthose states which take a liberal view and allow ;
any amount of competene evidence of gross negligence as
admissable in defensepro tonto; and,second,those states
which allow only evidence of gross negligence which makes
entirely worthless the attorney's employment. But with-
out discussing the doctrine generally, let us take up the
law in our own state and endeavor to establish a rule;
the best results may be attAined by following the cases
down to the present time. Beginning with the case of
Runyan v.Nichols,(11 John.R.547) in 1814,the question
arose,whether in an action- y an attorney against his
client to recover his fees,the client could set up the
plaintiff's negligence in conducting the suitlas a bar
pro tonto. The court were of the opinion that he
could,but held that it could not be pleaded in general
issuebut must give previous notice. In 1817 on the
same principle it was decided that in an action to re-
cover for work arn labor done, the defendant to reduce
the amount of recovery,could show that work was done
negligently by the plaintiff. (Grant v.Button 14 John.R.
377) In 1834 it was held that an attorney could not
recover compensation in prosecuting a cause,when the
judgment wa: set aside for irregularities on account of
his negligence. (Hopping v. ueen 12 Wend.517) In
Gleason v.Clark (9 Cowen 57) the court conmenting upon
the doctrine said: "If this species of defense goes to
destroy the plaintiff's claim entirely,it is proper
under the general issue; if merely to reduce the damages
notice should be given. This seems to be the rule
collected from Runyon v.Nichols,supra,and Sill v.Rood
(15 John.R.231). In VanWallhoffen v.Newcombe (10 Hun
240) the court uses the following language: 'The law re-
quires that every counselor shall possess arx use ade-
quate skill and learning,and that he shall employ them
in every caseaccording to the importance arri in-
tricacy of the case; and if a cause miscarries in con-
sequence of culpable negligence or gross ignorance of an
atorneyhe can recover no coi:pensation for ary services t.
which he has rendered,but which were useless to his
client by reason of his neglect or ignorance." In
1883 two cases came before Court of Appeals both sub-
stantially involving the same factsviz; the attorneys
had been guilty of gross negligence and even abuse in
their duty to the client by which he was injured far more
than benefited. In an action by the attorneys for their
fees the court held that the injury to the client was a
complete defense to such action. (Chatfield v.Si.n:rOns
92 N.Y. 209; Andrews v.Tyng 92 N.Y.l6) In Carter v.
Talcott (36 Hun 396) the court said'Afrl the person or
persons employing them are in that manner deprived of
their legal rightsthen they will not only forfeit all
legal claims for compensation,but in addition to that
be justly held responsible for any loss or injury sus-
tained by means of such conduct. "  If analogy con-
trols it seems that negligence is the proper subject of
set off pro tanto; on this basis it has been decided
in an action by a surgeon for professional services)
that malpractice is a proper subject of set off and if
not so setoff in the trial court it will be deemed to
be waived and cannot be pleaded in the courts above.
(Gates v.Preston 41 N.Y.113; Blair v.Bartlett,75 N.Y. 150
Reasoning from analogy it is difficult to see why such
negligence on the part of the attorney may not be plead-
ed as a set off pro tanto. If it is allowed to defeat
the whole cause of action by the attorney,what rule of
law is there to stand between such a defense and a set
off pro tanto ? Indeed,it springs out of the contract
between attorney ard client and the relation merging
from such contract; it has its life and death in such
relation and is intimately connected therewith. Such
conduct teriys to defeat the object of the professional
employment and is properly an equity which may be set
up in defense of the attorney's recovery. It is 'a
cause of action arising out of the contract or transac-
tion' and we fail to see any reason why it may not be
set up as a de-fense pro tanto to the attorney's
recoveryas well as an absolute defense. And if an
opinion, in anticipation of a decision on that point,is
proper,it is that the Court of Appeals would not hesitate
to hold such negligence a proper defefise pro tanto; and
that under our present system of pleading such defense
might be pleaded in the general issue. That such rule
is a salutary oneand well calculated to do final and
complete justice between the 12arties,and most expeditious..
ly and least expensively, cannot be doubted.
The next question in natural order is,can the
attorney abandon his client's cause of action ? In
answer to this the courts say,nothe contract of re-
tainer is an entire contract to conduct the proceedings
to final termination; It would work great harm to the
client if the attorney could,at any tiLe he chose for ary
frivolous causeabandon the suit. He can only abandon
the service for justifiable causeaai reasonable notice
to his client-aid if hewithout just amd ample cause,
abandons the servicebefore the final determination of
the cause,he forfeits all right to payment for any ser-
vices already rendered by him. The contract being
entire he must perform it entirely in order to earn his
compensation. The remaining question is,what shall
constitute "justifiable cause ?" As one court has
said,"it has not been laid down in any general rule,and
cannot be.' If the client refuses to advance money to
pay the expenses of the litigation,or unreasonably refus-
es to advance money during the progress of a long
litigation to his attorney to apply upon his compensation
or for any coanduct on the part of the clientwhich would
tend to degrade or humiliate the attorney,such as at-
tempting to sustain his case by subornation of witnesses
or any ot-er unjustifiable means,would furnish suffic-
ient cause to abandon the case. It was held that where
the client,without his attorney's consentemployed an
assistant counsel with whom the attorney's relation was
such that they could not cordially co-operate, the attorn-
ey was justified in withdrawing from the caseand the
client was still held liable for services rendered.
(Tenney v.Bergen 93 N.Y. 524) Although the attorney
is thus bound to entire perforrnanceani the contract as
to him is treated as an entire one, it is a singular
feature of the law that it should not be treated as en-
tire on the other side; for it is held that a client may
discharge his attorney arbitrarily,without any cause)at
any time,and be liable to pay him only for the services
which he has rendered up at the time of his discharge.
(Eliot v.Lawton 7 Allen 274,276.)
CHAPTER VII.
Compensation for Legal Services - Under
Civil and Common Law - Rule changed in
America - Reasonable Compensation - What is-
"Contingent Fees - Their evil Effect - Their
beneficial Effect - The Limit - Their legal
Effect in New York.
The practice of the law,through a series of
evolutionshas now become to be considered as something
substantial and as possessing a pecuniary worth to the
recipient of such services. It is recognized,not only
as an honorable callingbut one of the common vocations
by which the practioioner earns a livlihood. Obliga-
tions assumed and duties performed by virtue of his re-
tainer are accompanied and balanced by the co-relative
obligation of the client to compensate the attorney
what his services are reasonably worth or the amount
agreed upon between them. From the origin of the
relation back in the civil law of Rome the duties of
advocate were purely gratuitous or honorary and on the
other hand his fee or reward was not legally obligatory
but was a mere honorariuma token of thankfulness. so
in England the barrister or advocate could not sue for his
fees on,the theory that his services were purely gratui-
tous and honorary not based upon any contract for labor
or services;arnl at the same time the barrister was se-
cure from all actions for gross negligence etc. But
this view was clearly defective and inappropriate to the
free and practical ideas of American peopleand when the
question arose was promptly repudiated by all the courts
except those of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. But later
in those states and in England statutes have conformed
the law to the prevailing American view; and now in all
the states it is unquestioned that the attorney may re-
cover his feeswhatever they are reasonably worth;and by
virtue of the retainer there is an implied promise to
pay for them on a quantum meruit. Assuming this right
exists and is asserted the question arises,what is the
measure of coapensationwhat is the quantum meruit,and
how is it determined ? 'What that sum should be is
determinable by the importance of the contest, the labor
and responsibility of counseland every circumstance
attending the cause whichaccording to established
usage,serves to guide to a conclusion as to what is the
proper professional charge in such a state of circum-
stances . (Holly Springs v.Manning,55 Miss.380, 388)
In determining the amount of his compensation the fol-
lowing facts should be considered: (1) The greatness of
the cause pecuniarily and otherwise, (2) The labor and
care bestowed by the attorney, (3) His professional
stailing,learning,ability and skill, (4) Length of liti-
gation, (5) The usage of the court,and (6) The customs
of the locality. The usual charge of the ordinary
attorney in a like cause is the standard; not what the
attorney or client may thihk but what is the usual charge.
Hence in all cases professional compensation is
gauged not so much by the amount of laboras by the
amount in controversy,the ability of the attorney,and
the result of the effort. It is one of the delicate
judicial inquiries and requires every material fact to
appear. Interest on the amount of compensation begins
to run from the time the account is renidered; and the
Statute of Limitations from the recovery of judgment
in the cause in which he acted as attorney. (Mygott v.
Wilcox )45 N.Y. 306)
Discussing the attorneys action on a contract for
compensation,its extentwhat contracts may be enforced
etc.we enter a field not altogether settled and on which
there is a great diversity of opinion,due partly to the
innovation upon the rigid English rule and partly to
the standard of public policy by which the relation of
attorney and client is measured. Under the strict
English rule of maintenance and chamzperty an attorney
was not allowed to contract for any contingent compen-
sation nor to advance any bonus whatsoever to aid in the
conduct of the cause; and any contract to that effect
was held illegal. But in this country those rigid
rules found but little favorand in some states have
been entirely repudiated. Treating this subject of
ucontingent fees4m it would be but time idly spent in
trying to reconcile the conflicting views in all the
states or to deduce any rule applicable generally~with-
in the limited space which can be devoted to its discus-
sion. Our endeavor will be,in the light of former dis-
cussions,to find the true place of the contingent fee
in the lawyers Code of Ethicsto what extent its use is
evil and on the other hand to what extent commendable,
giving particular attention to the law of our own state.
An agreement by an attorney with his client ; (a) to
conduct the proceedings of a cause and to receive in
compensation a fee contingent upon,or in proportion to,
his success; or (b) when the attorney furnishes the
expenses of the litigation in consideration of having
placed in his hands a claim to prosecute; or (c) to pur-
chase the clients cause of action for the purpose of
bringing suit thereon; or (d) to pay to the attorney,
in case of success,payments or "refreshersu after and in
addition to the first agreed compensation,have from the
origin of such practices down to the present time,been
uonsidered by the ablest and ,ost honorable jurists
as dangerous to the administration of justice and as
corrupting the morale of the profession. Foremost amorg
those who have supported the practice has been Judge
Countryman his little book entitled 'Compensation for
legal services. 0 To show the importance of the ques-
tion we quote,viz; "It is a question which will unavoid-
ably meet each one of you at the thresholdand will at-
tend you at every step of your practice at the bar."
He argues that such contracts are conmendable if made in
honesty and good faith. He says : "It is a volun-
tary relation of employment or labor, and like all other
relations of this character,is merely the result of
voluntary contract between the parties involving the
obligation of service on one side and of compensation
on the other. x x x x There is no conceivable
rule of ethicsby which the same terms of service can be
regarded as just and right in the contracts of ministers,
merchants,and mechanicsand wrong or irmoral only between
attorneys and clients:" and,he arguesthat they may
with perfect propriety "agree in advance on the terms of
their advocacy or stipulate for contingent compensa-
tion out of the proceeds of the litigationuetc; and he
asks; "Is there indeed one rule of morals for the
guidance of the advocate in his relation to others,and a
different rule for the rest of mankind ?" The Albany
Law Journal answered"unhesitatingly there is". But
with all deference,do they not leave the distinguishing
point untouched; is it not perfectly clear when we say
that the morals are the same in all cases but it is the
application of the same morals to widely differing circun-
stances and vocations,that justifies the distinction ?
It would be preposterous to say that the employment of an
advocate ,and that of a mechanic or doctor are
similar to any extent. It is only true in this far,
that they are both the results of agreement and in
both cases there is compensation. To place them in the
same catagory would be to strip the attorney of his
office in the court as minister of justice,his position
as trustee and keeper of his clients inviolable secrets,
and in shortto transfer him from the vantage ground
of legal adviser,on which the client is dependent,to that
of a mere laborer or servant; and to strip the re-
tainer of that fiduciary nature and the confidence re-
posed. It is an indisputable fact that if there is
any one relation where there is an inequality between
the parties it is that of attorney ard client; the
continuous dependence of the client and the influence
over him by the attorney,the confidence reposes in the
attorneyhis superior skill and knowledge of the law,and
his complete control of the proceedings in the cause,
gives him a legal and moral advantage over his client
which is looked upon by the courts with searching dili-
gence. In this very fact of inequality between at-
terney and client,and his possible,and,in some cases,
actualinfluence over juries and judges,lies the se-
cret of the conservative policy of the law which stamps
such contracts as antagonistic to the client,to the
court,to the administration of justice,to the integrity
of the Barand consequently to the coniunity. To say
that the use of contingent fees does not lend a great
opportunity coupled with an inducement to resort to
chicanery and defeat the administration of justice,
would be contrary to facts. It is this fact which
fills the reports of our State and National Bar Associa-
tion with pleas for professional purity; and it tas this
evil which led Samuel Hand to urge before our Bar
Association in 1879 that contingent fees "were univer-
sally regarded in the profession as disreputable,un-
worthyand demoralizing, and tending to degrade the pro-
fession and impair the administration of justice-" and
Uare not changed in their characterbecause they may
possibly have ceased to be illegal; that the character
of these practices renains the stme as ever; that they
are stillas ever,demoralizing and deteriorating in
their tendency, that they doas ever,tend to barratry,
to stirring up of suitsthe encouragement of litigation
and the tampering with evidence. That they are an
easy arnd tempting source of large profits to able and
adroit lawyers; that such cases,with proper management,are
sure to succeed before juries~and it is rare that a case
cannot,on some questionbe got before the jury; that the
conmunistic tendencies of the present time produce
enormous verdicts - fortunes in themselves; that such
temptations are calculated to drag away the profession
from its moorings,and its regular steady business,to
these barratrous speculations; that while there may be
no harm in arranging a contingent fee with a poor man,
who applies to an attorneyyet the tendency of permitting
such arrangements is to set members of the profession
advertising for such cases,soliciting at tbe expense of
all manly and professional dignity,persons wno are known
to have causes of actionad inducing them to constantly
violate the statutes against the advancement of monies as
aa inducement to placing suits in their hands) that
worthless persons,having nothing) risking nothingare in-
duced under this system to present and swear through
simulated causes of action,relying on altorneys to
furnish all necessary monies and divide the profits
if successful. All these mischiefs and irregularties
are injurious to the standing before the world and to the
inward tone of the profession. "  Can it be con-
ceived that there is arTy serious argument to detract
from the truthfulness and force of this replete state-
ment ? We think not. The policy of the law has ever
been to subordinate the interests of the attorney to
those of trie client,and to sanction the practice of
contingent fees is to disregard this well settled
principleby giving the attorney a pecuniary interest
antagonistic to the client and to the court.
Having noticed its evil effectswhat is the exact
limit to which such contracts may be s anctioned ? Has
it any place in the lawyers Code of Ethics,and,if so,
where and to what extent ? There are not a few cases
arising where there is a pronounced wrong,a meritorious
cause of action,and an indigent client,whowithout the
aid of a contingent fee contract,would be utterly unable
to pursue a just remedy and thereby be subjected to per-
manent injury. He would be entitled to legal remedy,
but otherwise he would be unable to avail himself of it;
he is an object of charity; in such cases the attorney
is justified and even commendable , in accepting a re-
tainerat the client's request,upon a contingent compen-
sation. But there has sprung up3 through the fertile
growth of the contingent fee,a class of lawyersor rather
pettifoggers M negligence" or 'accident" lawyerswhose
business is chiefly confined to accident cases on con-
tingent fees,and who,whenever there is a railroad wreck,
or the likeappear upon the scene first of all,even be-
fore doctor or undertaker,and solicit the cause of some
poor unfortunate who,in the excitement and sufferingis
in a fit state of mind to make almost any kind of a
contract. This class of lawyers actually exist,ari
they are sure sooner or later to receivefrom their pro-
fessional Lrthers their just denomination as despised,
disreputable pettifoggers unworthy of 'he name lawyer
and of the professional distinction the courts have
conferred upon them. It is this kinl of pettifoggery
in itE- innulerable costs,silently working its way,
that plays havoc in the sphere of professional honor.
And if these remarks are true as to contingent fees,a
fortiori, it is true of purchases of the client's
cause of action in whole or in part,by the attorney.
We will not then repudiate,as wholly inadmissable
the taking of contingent feeson the contrary,they are
so,::etimes perfectly proper,and are called for by public
policyno less than by humanity. With this explana-
tion let it be resolved with David Hofforn,"never so to
purchase my client's cause,in whole or in part,- but still
reserve to myself,on proper occasions,and with proper
guards,the professional privilege, (denied by no law amorg
us) of agreeing to receive a contingent cormpensationfree
ly offeredfor services wholly to be rendered,and
where it is the only way by which the matter can either
be prosecutedor defended;u under all other circumstances
regarding contingent fees as abnoxious.
Turning now from the ethical side of contingent
feesto the legal side~let us endeavor to ascertain
their exact status in the law of our own state as regu-
lated by statutes and adjudicated cases. In Merritt Y.
Lambert (10 Paige 352) Chancellor VWalworth pronounced a-
gainst a contract where the attorney was to share in the
subsect matter of the litigationsaying; "the aILeged
agreement was void as being contrary to public policy,
as it placed the interests of the solicitor directly
in conflict with his paramount duty to his client."
But in a later case (1824) it was decided that the
doctrine of maintenance and champerty were obsolete
except so far as embraced in our statutes,and that a
contract by which the atOrney was to have a part of the
thing recovered in consideration of prosecuting the
suit and bearing the expenses of the litigation,was
valid and enforceable (Thallimer v.Brinckerhoff,3
Cow. 623,643; Sedgwick v.Stanton 14 N.Y.296). This was
a marked innovation upon the former rulebut has con-
tinued to be the law. This matter is now regulated by
the Civil Code (sec.73-74) Section 73 forbids the
purchase of obligations by any attorney for the purpose
and with the intent of bringing suit thereon. But this
section does not apply to purchases for the purpose of
bringing a suit thereon in a court not of record.
(Goodell v.The People,5 Parks CroR.2o6) Neither does it
apply to purchases in good faith for the purpose of pro-
tecting some legal or equitable right,nor to a case
where some other purposeeven though slight ,contributed
to inducing the purchase,a.xi the intent to sue was
merely incidental or contingent. (Moses v. McDivitt 88
N.Y.62); nor does it apply where suit was already pend-
ing. (Whetmore v.Hegeman 88 N.Y.69) Section 74 forbids
the giving of any valuable consideration or the promise
of any valuable consideration "as an inducement to the
placing or in consideration of havir placed" in the
hands of such attorney a demand of any kind for the pur-
pose of bringing suit thereon. But these sections are
substantially a re-enactment of the earlier statutes.
(Browning v.Morrin 100 N.Y. 148)
NOTE. Merely a passing remark will be given the
States generailyclassifying them briefly ard. convenient-
ly under their proper heads as follows; (1) Those states
Statutes like the above in New York give the utmost
freedom to contract for contingent fees anir still deny
the right to give a valuable consideration for the pur-
pose of inducing a litigation. It undoubedly contemplat-
es a case in which the action might never have been
brought but for the inducement of such valuable consid-
eration held out by the attorney. The leading case
of Fowler v.Callan (102 N.Y.395)goes a long way in set-
tling the interpretation of the statute. The facts of
that case were as follows; Proceedings having been com-
menced against a devisee under a willhe gave the plain-
tiffan attorney,a deed for one undivided half part of
in which the common law of maintenance and champerty
have been abrogated: Texas,CaliforniaNew Yorkand
Michigan. (2) Those states where such dottrine is dis-
tinctly or by express implication recognized: MaineKan-
sas,Alabama,OhioOregon,West Virginia,MarylandVirginia,
South Carolina and New Hampshire. (3) In the following
states to be champertous the attorney must stipulate to
pay the costs of the action:Delaware-Georgia,Illinois,
IowaMissouriWisconsinMinnesota,Mississippi,Tennessee
the property taking back his covenant to conduct the de-
fense to a close,paying all the costs and expenses of
the litigation,and indemnifying the devisee against the
same. The court decided that this was no violation of
the statute. Finch J.delivering the opinionsaid :'The
agreement appears to have been purely one of compensa-
tion. x x x x The contract in no way induced the
litigation. That was already begun and existed inde-
pendently of the agreement.,and originated in other
causes. It did not tend to prolong the litigation
it made it to the interests of the attorney to close it
as promptly as posible,ani at as little cost and ex-
pense as prudence would permit. The plaintiff there-
fore stirred up no strife,produced no litigation. X x x x
The statute presupposses the existence of some right of
action, valueless unless prosecuted to the judgment,which
and Rhode Island. (4)In the following states the English
rule is strictly adhered to; IndianaKentucky,Massachus-
etts and North Carolina. (5) In New York and Louisiana it
is entirely governed by statute.
Am.and Eng.En.of L. Vol.III p.73.
the owner might or might not prosecute on his own behalf,
but which he is induced to place in the harnds of a par-
ticular attorney by reason of his agreement to loan or
advance money to the client. It contemplates a case
in which the action might never have been brought but
for the irducement of a loan or advance transferred by
the attorney,and in which the latter by officious in-
terference procures a suit to be brought and obtains a
retainer in it. M  This opinion of the learned judge is
the best exposition of the law in this state on the sub-
ject of contingent fees to be found anywhere. But,how-
ever,if in that case the legatee had not been threatened
with litigation it would have presented a different
question and one now open in this state. It is to be
remembered that in the above case the litigation was
already commenced and the court lay particular strees on
the fact that in it "there was no vicious element of in-
ducing litigation or holding out bribes for a retainer.'
In the case supposedwhere no litigation had been com-
menced)we see no reason why it would not be within the
mischief covered by the statute. There would be a bare
possibility that such an inducement on the part of the
attorney would not induce the litigation,but a strong
probability that it would. It is this strong probabili
ty which the statute seeks to guard against; it is a
preventative remedy. Such an inducement would,in all
probability,tend to stimulate the client to litigatien
and accelerate the strifeif indeed it did not actually
induce the litigation; and it can make no difference
whether the inducement was held out in the attorneys *
or several blocks from his office. And it seems that
such transaction would be grievous enough to fall with-
in the Code provision; and in this conclusion we are
supported by the case of Oshei v.Ia.zzarone (15 Supp.933)
although not a strong case and no reasons are offered
for its support.
In conclusion the writer may refer again to the in,-
centive which has led him to investigate this particular
subject,namely; that he considers the first duty of an
attorney,before starting on his professional journey,
is to study well those legal principles governing his
rights;duties and liabilities; and if his efforts,more
or less laborioushave succeeded in presenting in an
acceptable manner the salient features which character-
ize the relation of attorney ani client)cleared the mist
from any point heretofore obscure,brought together and
systematized d~ctrines heretofore uncertain,mingled with
the discussion ethics enough to bring out the reasons
for the legal principles,and thus paved the way,in any
degree,for an easier arl more pleasant travel through
the labyrinth of professional relations,his efforts have
been amply rewarded.

